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The Hopkins' Opinions: Criminal Law and
Procedure
Hon. WILLIAM A. GRIMES*
I wish to state at the outset that Pace University School of
Law was indeed fortunate to have had Judge Hopkins as its
dean, even for a little while. He is a man of high principles, deep
concern and limitless compassion.
My major association with Judge Hopkins has been in con-
nection with the Appellate Judges Conference of the American
Bar Association, to which he gave a large portion of his life, serv-
ing on various committees and as its chairman. When I served as
chairman, I always knew that I could count on him to carry out
any task where his sound judgment was needed. In all these ac-
tivities his only concern was the improvement of the appellate
judiciary and the administration of justice.
In searching through the numerous opinions which he wrote
in the area of criminal law and procedure, I recognized several
cases that I know he was struggling with during the years that
we spent so much time together. A review of these decisions has
deepened the great respect and admiration that I already have
for this great man. I have been impressed with the clear and
concise language used by Judge Hopkins and his ability to say
all that is necessary in relatively short opinions, a gift most of us
wish all appellate judges possessed. Another thing I like about
Jim Hopkins' opinions is that he cites his authorities in the body
of the opinion instead of in footnotes and he uses footnotes very
* Chief Justice, Retired, Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire; Distin-
guished Visiting Professor at California Western School of Law. Because I am living un-
til June in San Diego where I am a visiting professor at California Western School of
Law, there has been considerable delay in my receiving word of the well deserved dedica-
tion of this volume in honor of my good friend, Judge James D. Hopkins. With a March
1 deadline and with a commitment to spend a week in Florida at an Appellate Judges'
Seminar, I am afraid there may be insufficient time for me to do an adequate job on this
article. Nevertheless, because of my high regard for Judge Hopkins, I do wish to write
something.
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sparingly. Nothing detracts the reader of an opinion more than
the excessive use of footnotes, which attract the eye away from
the body of the opinion.'
In People v. Swift,2 Judge Hopkins dealt with the question
whether Miranda warnings had to be given in the precise man-
ner set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona.3 Writing for a unanimous court, he held that it was suf-
ficient if the substance of the warnings was "imparted in a man-
ner which would be understandable by the ordinary person-at
least in the absence of evidence that the person in custody did
not understand them."" In deciding Swift as he did in 1969, he
came to the same conclusion that the United States Supreme
Court did in California v. Prysock5 more than twelve years later.
On at least three other occasions, the Supreme Court
seemed to reflect earlier decisions of Judge Hopkins. In a 1963
decision,6 Judge Hopkins dealt with section 667 of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure7 which provides for dismissal of a
prosecution if an indictment is not found against the defendant
at the next term unless good cause is shown. Defendant Saccenti
had been arrested in May 1959 and arraigned on a larceny com-
plaint. He was released on bail and the proceeding was held in
suspense until April 1961 when he moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for want of prosecution because no indictment had been
returned. Pending a hearing, the prosecutor obtained an indict-
ment and the motion to dismiss was denied on the ground that
the indictment had made section 667 inapplicable. Writing for a
majority of the court, Judge Hopkins determined that the intent
of the code was to protect a defendant's right to a speedy trial
and that prejudice to a defendant who had been arrested could
1. Mindful of the irony involved, the editors are nevertheless compelled to follow
the standard law review format and put citations in footnotes.
2. 32 A.D.2d 183, 300 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2d Dep't 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018
(1970).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. People v. Swift, 32 A.D.2d at 187, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
5. 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
6. People v. Saccenti, 18 A.D.2d 311, 311-12, 239 N.Y.S.2d 725, 727 (2d Dep't 1963),
rev'd, 14 N.Y.2d 1, 196 N.E.2d 885, 247 N.Y.S.2d 479, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 854 (1964).
7. N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure § 667. The current version of this statute is
found at: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWS § 190.80 (McKinney 1982).
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occur as much before an indictment as after.s The delay of over
two years after the arrest in obtaining an indictment without ad-
equate excuse was thus held to deny defendant the right to a
speedy trial.9 The court of appeals reversed on the basis of the
statute alone, without consideration of the right to a speedy
trial. 10 Twelve years after Judge Hopkins' decision, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that, for the purposes of the
speedy trial requirement of the sixth amendment, the time be-
gins to run from the time of arrest and not from a later
indictment."
In People ex rel. Arnold v. Allen,' Judge Hopkins' holding
was consistent with the law later laid down by the Supreme
Court in Michigan v. Doran"s and Pacileo v. Walker.14 Judge
Hopkins held that in extradition proceedings, the asylum state
cannot, consistent with our federal system and the requirement
of comity, decide the validity of the indictment or the compli-
ance with constitutional safeguards of the demanding state's
procedures.' 5
In People v. Duchin,'6 Judge Hopkins wrote for the major-
ity that in a non-capital case, a defendant does not have an ab-
solute right to waive trial by jury. This is consistent with the
later holding of the Supreme Court in Singer v. United States.17
The defendant in Duchin filed a written waiver of a trial by jury
stating that pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial by jury. The
New York Constituton provides for such a waiver, 8 but the trial
8. People v. Saccenti, 18 A.D.2d at 312-13, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
9. Id. at 314, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
10. People v. Saccenti, 14 N.Y.2d 1, 196 N.E.2d 885, 247 N.Y.S.2d 479, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 854 (1964).
11. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975).
12. 30 Misc. 2d 1031, 220 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1961).
13. 439 U.S. 282 (1978) (holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 3182, courts of the asylum
state are bound by extradition clause).
14. 449 U.S. 86 (1980) (18 U.S.C. § 3182 does not give courts of asylum state author-
ity to inquire into prison conditions of demanding state).
15. People v. Allen, 30 Misc. 2d 1031, 220 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1961).
16. 16 A.D.2d 483, 229 N.Y.S.2d 46 (2d Dep't 1962), afj'd, 12 N.Y.2d 351, 190
N.E.2d 17, 239 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1963).
17. 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (defendant's constitutional right is to an impartial trial by
jury).
18. People v. Duchin, 16 A.D.2d at 484, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (citing N.Y. CONST., art.
1983]
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court denied the waiver. Defendant was convicted by a jury and
appealed. Judge Hopkins also held that the court did not have
an absolute right to deny the waiver and that under the circum-
stances of the case, the trial judge abused his discretion and or-
dered a new trial without a jury.1'
The holdings of Judge Hopkins' opinions can also be found
in subsequent legislation. In People v. Clayton,20 a landmark de-
cision in New York, a statute authorized the dismissal of an in-
dictment "in the furtherance of justice" on the court's own mo-
tion.2 ' In Clayton, the defendant moved to dismiss on the
ground that he had not been brought to trial.2" The trial judge
dismissed the motion sua sponte "in the furtherance of justice"
under the statute. Judge Hopkins, writing for the court, held
that a dismissal could not be ordered on the court's own motion
without notice and a hearing. The opinion, setting forth seven
factors to be considered in making the determination, was codi-
fied in an amendment to the statute.23
Judge Hopkins showed his sense of fairness in People v.
Schwartz,2' where again for a unanimous court he construed a
New York statute which forbids the use of any "confession or
admission" at trial unless written notice has been given to the
defendant.2 5 At issue was a statement by the defendant that he
had been at the address next door to the scene of an assault
when in fact he had been at the scene. The statement was in-
tended by the defendant to be exculpatory and it was therefore
argued that the statute did not apply.2 Judge Hopkins, how-
ever, read the statute broadly as pertaining to all incriminating
statements regardless of the subjective intent of the defendant.
I, § 2).
19. Id. at 485, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
20. 41 A.D.2d 204, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dep't 1973).
21. N.Y. CrIM. PROc. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1982).
22. See United States ex rel. Clayton v. Mancusi, 326 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), aff'd, 454 F.2d 454 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Montayne v. Clayton, 406 U.S.
977 (1972). For a brief discussion of the facts of Clayton, see Cohalan, James D. Hop-
kins, An Appreciation, 3 PAcE L. Rzv. 479 (1983).
23. N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1982).
24. 30 A.D.2d 385, 292 N.Y.S.2d 518 (2d Dep't 1968).
25. Id. at 386-87, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 520-21. N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure § 813-f.
The current version of this statute is found at N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW § 710.30 (McKin-
ney 1971 & Supp. 1982).
26. Id. at 388, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
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He pointed out that statements the defendant believes will de-
tour the police away from him may be "doubly damning when
the falsity of the ruse is uncovered. 2 7 He noted that in that very
case the prosecutor in his argument used the statement as evi-
dence of guilt. This refusal to consider the subjective intent of
the defendant as to the incriminating character of the statement
is of course in line with the Supreme Court decisions of Miranda
v. Arizona2 8 and Rhode Island v. Innis.2 9
In the Schwartz case, Judge Hopkins also showed his
knowledge of Supreme Court law when he held that a statement
given without compliance with Miranda could not be used for
impeachment purposes when the defendant does not open the
inquiry by his own direct testimony going beyond denial of all
the elements of the crime.30 In other words, a denial cannot be
obtained on cross-examination for the purpose of using a confes-
sion which is otherwise inadmissible because of a failure to com-
ply with Miranda."
In the case of In re William L.,3" 2 involving a fourteen-year-
old boy who was awakened at 3:00 a.m. in his home and taken to
the police station, Judge Hopkins again showed his sense of fair-
ness. The boy's mother was told it was not a serious matter, that
her son would be home in an hour or so, and it was not neces-
sary that she come along. At the station, the boy was given the
bare bones of the Miranda warnings, to which he did not re-
spond except to say he wanted to tell what had happened. He
was then questioned by four or five police officers. His state-
ment, amounting to a confession to a stabbing death, was sought
to be suppressed in the delinquency proceeding which followed.
The boy's mother was never informed of the boy's right to retain
27. Id.
28. 384 U.S. 436, 476-77.
29. 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 (1980).
30. People v. Schwartz, 30 A.D.2d at 388-89, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 522-23. See Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); see also Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (illegally seized evidence held admissible for the
purpose of impeaching defendant's statements made during direct testimony as opposed
to statements made in response to the prosecution's cross-examination as in Schwartz
and AgneUo).
31. People v. Schwartz, 30 A.D.2d at 390, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
32. 29 A.D.2d 182, 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 21 N.Y.2d 1005,
238 N.E.2d 327, 290 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1968).
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counsel or to have one appointed if poverty prevented retaining
one, nor was she present during the questioning-3 Judge Hop-
kins held that, even apart from the mandates of In re Gault34
and Miranda, due process requirements and "the special condi-
tions of care which a juvenile's interrogation demands" rendered
the confession invalid.38 Judge Hopkins further stated that "a
boy of 14, aroused from his sleep at 3:00 a.m., taken to a police
station and questioned by four or five police officers concerning
a homicide, would scarcely be in a frame of mind capable of ap-
preciating the nature and effect of the constitutional warnings
given him before the questioning begins. '36
Similarly, in People v. Ward,87 Judge Hopkins, in a one-
page opinion, required a new trial for a defendant convicted of
driving while intoxicated because the blood used in the test, the
result of which had been admitted in evidence, had been ex-
tracted after the skin had been swabbed with alcohol. There was
evidence that it was "possible" that alcohol might have entered
the blood withdrawn and a statute provided for the admission of
a chemical test only when conducted in accordance with stan-
dard operating procedures, which had not been followed.3 8
In People v. Goggins, 9 a majority of the court reversed a
conviction because of the refusal of the prosecution to reveal the
identity of an informer. The majority decided that the identity
should have been revealed, and rejected the need for an in cam-
era hearing.40 Judge Hopkins, although agreeing that a new trial
should be ordered, argued that the trial judge after an in camera
hearing was in a better position to determine "the proper break-
33. Id.
34. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (procedural safeguards for juveniles).
35. In re William L., 29 A.D.2d at 184, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
36. Id.
This case stands in stark contrast to the lack of concern shown by five members of
the Supreme Court of the United States for the plight of juveniles in Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707 (1979). In that case, a confession, obtained after extensive two-on-one inter-
rogation, was held admissible even though the minor, on being given the Miranda warn-
ings, asked to talk to his probation officer, but was refused the opportunity. Michael C.
indicates that the result would be the same if the boy had asked for his mother or father.
37. 14 Misc. 2d 518, 178 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Westchester County Ct. 1958).
38. Id. at 519, 178 N.Y.S.2d at 708-09.
39. 42 A.D.2d 227, 228, 346 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (2d Dep't 1973), afi'd, 34 N.Y.2d 163,
313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974).
41. Id. at 229-30, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 383-84.
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ing point between the interest of the State and the interest of
the individual-the traditional role of due process under the
Constitution."'
This balance between the interests of the state and the indi-
vidual was later seen in many cases including People v. Vega, 2
an interesting case in which Judge Hopkins dissented. The ma-
jority held that a person, not arrested, who was suspected of
robbery and who had been identified without a beard in photo-
graphs, could not be required to shave his beard, grown since the
offense, so as to be placed in a lineup for identificaton by wit-
nesses who could not identify him with the beard.' 3 The major-
ity, mistakenly I think, confused probable cause to arrest with
probable cause to search. They stated that if the authorities had
probable cause to require the removal of the beard, they had
probable cause to arrest him, but without a prior arrest the
court had no jurisdicton to interfere with the suspect's right to
determine his appearance."'
Judge Hopkins in dissent, although agreeing that the right
to determine one's appearance is one that is guaranteed by the
Constitution, nevertheless argued that the right was subject to
regulation when a compelling state interest required." He said
that "[w]e should not tolerate an attempt to disguise one's ap-
pearance in order to escape the detection of a crime.' 46 He
pointed out that the fact that a criminal proceeding has not be-
gun, by an arrest or otherwise, should not prevent a subject from
being produced for identification procedures. Whether he should
be required to alter his appearance by removing his beard
should depend on the combination of the circumstances includ-
ing the seriousness of the crime, the degree of intrusion, the
transitory effect of the intrusion and the reliability of the infor-
mation sought. Considering all these factors, he concluded that
the order to remove the beard should stand.4' This case, in ef-
41. Id. at 231, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 385 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
42. 51 A.D.2d 33, 379 N.Y.S.2d 419 (2d Dep't 1976).
43. Id. at 35, 38, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 421, 424.
44. Id. at 38, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
45. Id. at 39, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 424-25 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 39, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 425 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 40-41, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 425-27 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
1983]
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
fect, involved the distinction between probable cause to arrest
and probable cause to search;"8 Judge Hopkins showed he was
aware of the distinction. Davis v. Mississippi, 49 a United States
Supreme Court decision, cited by Judge Hopkins, recognized
that there could be valid procedures to obtain physical evidence
from suspects where there was not yet probable cause to arrest
them.
People v. Parker"0 involved a parolee who was arrested for
criminal possession of a weapon, assault and attempted robbery.
He was arraigned the next day and counsel was assigned. The
following day he reported to his parole officer by phone. During
a visit to the parole officer two days later, he was asked about
the circumstances after being warned that any statement could
result in revocation of parole. No Miranda warnings were given,
however, with respect to the use of the statements in the pend-
ing criminal proceedings. Defendant admitted that a gun found
at the scene belonged to him."
The grand jury failed to indict the defendant and the
charges were dismissed. The parole officer again questioned the
defendant without giving the Miranda warnings, although he
was told any statements could be used to revoke his parole. The
defendant stated that he possessed the gun because he was car-
rying a large amount of money for a deposit as rent for an apart-
ment. He also submitted a written statement to the same effect.
The parole officer reported this information to the district attor-
ney and testified before the grand jury when the matter was re-
submitted. An indictment was returned for criminal possession
of a weapon.5
Judge Hopkins writing for a unanimous court held that al-
though Miranda warnings need not be given by a parole officer
in routine interviews within the parole system, a different rule
must apply to statements extracted and then used against the
parolee in a criminal proceeding outside the parole system. He
wrote that not only should Miranda warnings have been given
48. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 n.6 (1978).
49. 394 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1969).
50. 82 A.D.2d 661, 442 N.Y.S.2d 803 (2d Dep't 1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 815, 441
N.E.2d 1118, 455 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1982).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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but also "that the use of statements made by a parolee to his
parole officer as evidence in a criminal trial against the parolee
disrupts and destroys the confidence and trust which must inevi-
tably inhere in the relations created by the parole system. The
parole system. . . must be built on the frank communication[s]
...between parolee and his supervisor, and that relationship
will be damaged beyond repair if the indispensable pillar of can-
did exchange is undermined." 3
Writing for the court in Barber v. Rubin,54 Judge Hopkins
demonstrated his knowledge of due process and basic fourth
amendment law when he upheld an order of the trial court al-
lowing a doctor to extract hairs from the head of a person in-
dicted for murder. Hair had been found in the clinched fist of
the victim. Judge Hopkins found that probable cause existed
and that the extraction of the hairs would require no more than
minimal invasion of defendant's rights and that any danger or
harm to him would be slight.
People v. Iucci"5 presented an unusual problem in the area
of search and seizure. A wire tap had been authorized on the
phone of one Moss. While listening pursuant to this tap, the po-
lice learned from a conversation between Moss and one Ger-
itano, a telephone employee, of an illegal tap on the phone of
one Basciano to be operated from 424 Clinton Street. The police
then found the wire tap and learned it ran to the Clinton Street
residence of lucci. They obtained a warrant to search Iucci's res-
idence and pursuant to it discovered the illegal tap and a rifle
and other electronic equipment.6 Iucci was indicted and sought
to suppress the evidence on the basis that the police had failed
for 29 days to seal the tapes of the Moss tap in violation of a
statutory requirement that they be sealed immediately. Judge
Hopkins, writing for the court, upheld the search. He held that
the failure to seal the tapes in no way tainted the warrant or the
evidence and that to hold otherwise would make the validity of
the warrant depend on omissions taking place after its issuance
"a shifting and uncertain foundation for the administration of
53. Id. at 667, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
54. 72 A.D.2d 347, 424 N.Y.S.2d 453 (2d Dep't 1980).
55. 61 A.D.2d 1, 401 N.Y.S.2d 823 (2d Dep't 1978).
56. Id. at 1-2, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
1983]
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criminal justice. 57
In his dissent in People v. Abruzzi,58 Judge Hopkins showed
his capacity for innovation. In that case, patients of a doctor
complained about sexual misconduct during gynecological exam-
inations. The police arranged for a policewoman, posing as a pa-
tient, to visit the defendant's office to survey the inner office
while another officer viewed her from outside as she entered one
of the examination rooms. To do this, the officer outside was re-
quired to use a seven-foot ladder to see through a curtained win-
dow. While doing so, the officer could see into another room in
which the doctor was performing acts of sexual misconduct on a
woman. The officer had no warrant 9 and Judge Hopkins as-
sumed that one could not be obtained. 0 The majority held the
evidence inadmissible on familar fourth amendment grounds. 1
Judge Hopkins in his dissent agreed that the search could
not be justified under the fourth amendment but argued that
the exclusionary rule should exclude evidence only of past
crimes and should not close "the eyes and mouth of a police of-
ficer who sees a crime committed in his presence, even though
he is there illegally."" The court of appeals affirmed the major-
ity view, with one dissenter supporting the Hopkins' view.'
In Sackler v. Sackler,64 a divorce case, Judge Hopkins took
a more liberal view toward the exclusionary rule, and in a dis-
sent would have extended it to exclude evidence of adultery ob-
tained by a private party by means of an illegal entry into the
home of the defendant. Even though the majority opinion was
upheld, Judge Hopkins received three dissenting votes for his
view.
In two cases involving rights of religious freedom, Judge
Hopkins recognized the limitations of such rights. In People v.
57. Id. at 12, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
58. 52 A.D.2d 499, 385 N.Y.S.2d 94 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 813, 364
N.E.2d 1342, 396 N.Y.S.2d 649, cert. denied 434 U.S. 921 (1977).
59. Id. at 500-01, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 95-96.
60. Id. at 504, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 98 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 507, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 100 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
63. People v. Abruzzi, 42 N.Y.2d 813, 364 N.E.2d 1342, 396 N.Y.S.2d 649, cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977).
64. 16 A.D.2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dep't 1962) (Hopkins, J., dissenting), aff'd,
15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
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Woodruff," he wrote for a unanimous court that a grand jury
witness, who had been granted immunity, had no right to refuse
to testify on the ground that her testimony would violate her
religious principles. He wrote that, even though her belief was
sincere, the right of the individual must be balanced against the
interest of the state," and that
[defendant's] scruples must give way to the dominant right of the
State to maintain peace and order. If it were otherwise, the fabric
of society might be pierced and fatally rent by a religious belief
sincerely held by an individual in action or in non-action damag-
ing to the continuing existence of peace and order in the commu-
nity; and the individual right, given vitality by the community,
would take precedence over the right of the community to protect
itself and to perpetuate the liberties granted to the individual.67
Beautiful, almost poetic writing and the entire opinion is only
two and a half pages long with no footnotes. The decision was
affirmed by the court of appeals."
In La Rocca v. Lane," Judge Hopkins, writing for the ma-
jority, upheld the power of the trial court to prohibit a priest,
who was also an attorney, from wearing his clerical collar when
trying a jury case. He held that the state's right to a fair trial
and the importance of the appearance of fairness outweighed the
right to the free exercise of the priest-attorney's religious beliefs
which were subject to reasonable regulation when he was acting
in the secular role of an attorney.70 He wrote that "[tihere is
hardly a stronger interest within the governmental structure
than the preservation of the right to a fair trial, both by the
accused and by the prosecution."71 This decision was also upheld
by the court of appeals.m
65. 26 A.D.2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep't 1966), affd, 21 N.Y.2d 848, 236
N.E.2d 159, 288 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1968).
66. Id. at 238, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
67. Id. at 239, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90.
68. People v. Woodruff, 21 N.Y.2d 848, 236 N.E.2d 159, 288 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1968).
69. 47 A.D.2d 243, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't), affd, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d
606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
70. Id. at 248-49, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62.
71. Id. at 247, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
72. La Rocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d 606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
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In Lewinson v. Crews,3 the question was whether a blind
person was qualified to serve on a jury. The New York Judiciary
Law provided that to be qualified to serve as a juror, a person
must "[ble in the possession of his natural faculties and not in-
firm or decrepit. 7 4 The person involved held several advanced
degrees including a Ph.D. The majority held that a blind person
does not have his "natural facilities" according to the statute.
They pointed out that evidence may consist of photograph
charts, mechanical objects and other types of physical evidence
which require sight. Sight, they said, is also a factor in determin-
ing the credibility of a witness." Judge Hopkins dissented,70
pointing out that service as a juror was a privilege of citizenship
and that the right to trial by jury requires a jury representing a
broad spectrum of the community. He stated that the blind are
a large segment of our population and that a statute which dis-
qualifies the blind must do so in unmistakable terms and be
based on rational grounds. He argued that the New York statute
did not single out blindness as a disqualification and he would
construe the "natural faculties" language to refer to "the posses-
sion of intellectual power to discharge the duty . . . ." He
pointed out that there are blind judges who act alone whereas
jurors do not. He would leave the question to be determined as a
matter of discretion with respect to the particular litigation
involved.
In one of his longest opinions in this area of the law (seven
pages), Judge Hopkins dealt with a difficult problem involving
double jeopardy. People v. Fernandezs7 8 involved a defendant
who was indicted in 1967 for assault in the second degree and
resisting arrest. Instead of being tried on these charges, he was
tried and convicted of disorderly conduct arising out of the same
incident as the charges in the indictment. His conviction was
overturned on appeal as was his second conviction in 1970, at
which time the complaint was dismissed on the ground of insuf-
73. 28 A.D.2d 111, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83 (2d Dep't 1967), af/'d sub nom. In re Lewinson,
21 N.Y.2d 898, 236 N.E.2d 853, 289 N.Y.S.2d 619, appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 13 (1968).
74. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 596 (McKinney 1975) (repealed 1977).
75. Lewinson v. Crews, 28 A.D.2d at 112-13, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
76. Id. at 114, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
77. Id. at 115, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
78. 43 A.D.2d 83, 349 N.Y.S.2d 774 (2d Dep't 1973).
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ficient evidence.7 9 The prosecution then brought him to trial in
1972 on the indictment over defendant's objection that the New
York Criminal Procedure Act (CPL) barred separate prosecu-
tions arising out of the same transaction if they are joinable in
one accusatory instrument. He was convicted and appealed.8"
Judge Hopkins noted that in substance the same evidence
was used as was presented in the trial for disorderly conduct.
After reviewing the prior tests for the application of the rule
against double jeopardy including collateral estoppel, all of
which he said caused confusion, he wrote that CPL 40.20 as-
sumed a "divergent approach." He noted that the Act provides
that "a person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses
based upon the same act or criminal transaction" 8' unless one of
the enumerated exceptions to the rule applied. Exception (b)
states "[e]ach of the offenses as defined contains an element
which is not an element of the other, and the statutory provi-
sions defining such offenses are designed to prevent very differ-
ent kinds of harm or evil."8 He held that CPL 40.40 did not
apply because at the time of the indictment, the offense of disor-
derly conduct could not have been joined and it would be unfair
to apply the 1971 act to a 1967 indictment.
He also noted that the crimes involved probably could not
be considered the same crime under the first part of CPL 40.20.
However, he noted that the evil to be inhibited is common to all
three crimes and that the spirit of CPL 40.40 in seeking to avoid
harassment pervades the provisions of CPL 40.20. The convic-
tion was reversed and the indictment dismissed on double jeop-
ardy grounds.
It thus appears that Justice Brennan's single transaction
theory of double jeopardy may have won acceptance in New
York if not in Washington."3
79. Under current law, this would bar a retrial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1
(1978) (fifth amendment precludes second trial once reviewing court has found evidence
insufficient for jury's verdict of guilty).
80. The current version of this statute is found at N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 40.40
(McKinney 1981).
81. People v. Fernandez, 43 A.D.2d at 89, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
82. Id. at 90 n.8, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 780 n.8.
83. Id. at 89, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (citing Justice Brennan's concurrence in Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-57 (1970)).
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I have by no means done justice to the work of my old
friend in the criminal procedure field. However, time restraints
added to my own limitations stand in the way of a more deserv-
ing review of his work. I have not come close to covering all of
his opinions in this field, but have selected those I thought most
interesting. Reading through his opinions has made me even
more aware than I was before of the greatness of this man, who
has given so much of his life to the cause of justice and who so
deserves the honor of having this volume of the law review dedi-
cated to him.
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/7
